Does China’s Construction of a Deep-Sea Port in Peru Violate the Monroe Doctrine, and How Should the U.S. Respond?

By Matt Lensing, MTI Contributor

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) commercial investments in the Western Hemisphere directly encroach on the United States’ interests and security. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal highlighted one such project in Peru, a deep-water port, which will open new markets to the PRC by reducing transit times of goods between Asia and Latin America, and pull the region further away from U.S. influence, (Dube & Areddy, 2024).

Foreign policy scholars have extensively documented concerns of the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since its start in 2013. China’s President Xi Jingping has overtly communicated his ambitions, “to be a global leader and set up a China-centric ‘stable international order’ by 2049,” (Maxwell, 2021). While the PRC’s actions may not rise to 19^th century colonization it is still worth revisiting the Monroe Doctrine to consider if the U.S. should publish an update for China’s current interventions in Latin America.

The Monroe Doctrine aimed to counter European expansionism in the American hemisphere through four principles:

1. Non-colonization
2. Non-interference
3. Separate spheres of influence 
4. Neutrality in European Wars

The PRC, as a non-European power, while technically not violating the Monroe Doctrine undoubtedly challenges its principles by eroding the United States’ significance in its own hemisphere and building ports of entry for military presence in the region.

Non-Colonization

In his annual message to the U.S. Congress on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe declared the Western Hemisphere no longer open to colonization. Today the PRC may not be colonizing Latin American Countries (LAC) in the traditional sense, but without staking territorial claim the PRC still extracts key raw materials from Latin America through mining operations. This has a clear impact on the rapidly growing electric vehicle market with the PRC’s stake in lithium mines in countries like Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, (Gray, 2023). However more concerning is the PRC’s ability to impede a country’s sovereignty through the BRI’s, “no strings attached loans,” (Maxwell, 2021).

When LAC governments are unable to repay their loans the PRC assumes control of its investments, which occurred to a Sri Lankan port facility in 2017, (Maxwell, 2021). This same scenario could occur if Peru cannot make payments on the $3.5 billion Chancay Port, giving China claim to the property. This reality becomes increasingly likely as most LAC governments (22 of 31) have already signed onto the BRI affording the PRC greater opportunities to influence regional politics as well as economics, (Vergun, 2024). 

Non-Interference 

Today the PRC is having a direct impact on regional politics, which President Monroe would have viewed as interference when he drafted his doctrine. One of the largest BRI offerings is the installation of 5G networks built by Huawei, the PRC supported telecommunications company. The PRC’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires Chinese companies to cooperate with any state intelligence effort. This means the PRC can use 5G networks to digitally monitor citizens and spread disinformation aimed to politically and ideologically distance LAC governments from the U.S. 

Countries in Latin America have already adopted PRC leaning stances that directly oppose U.S. foreign policy. Currently only seven LAC governments have political ties to Taiwan, whom the U.S. supports with military aid despite officially adhering to the “One-China,” principle. Honduras, which is home to permanent U.S. military forces at Soto Cano Air Base, previously recognized Taiwan but has since cut ties after signing on to the BRI, (Richardson, 2024). Similarly, the former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro supported an openly pro-U.S. stance while campaigning, even publicly criticizing the PRC, but later adopted a neutral stance on Sino-U.S. disputes, (Pires & Gualberto do Nascimento, 2020). This shows that LAC governments are taking pro-PRC, or at least less pro-American, postures to keep their primary trading partner happy.

Neutrality in Global Conflict

Clearly the U.S. violated its own doctrine through involvement in both World Wars and continues the trend today with U.S. military aid to Ukraine. However, calibrating this principle toward the PRC should focus on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) posturing in the Western Hemisphere. Deep water port investments, like the Peru sea port, offer the PLA options in global conflict through, “dual use,” facilities. 

Since Chinese domestic law requires its companies to consider national defense needs in their operations, they may provide preferential access to PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels at port terminals as well as directly supporting defense logistics in the region, (Dube & Areddy, 2024). The PLAN then validates their operational plans through port calls, and training missions, to PRC funded facilities. These strategic arrangements offer the PLA options for projecting combat power in the Western Hemisphere, which could deliver military forces against their primary adversary, the U.S.

Separate Spheres of Influence

The PRC’s violation of the final Monroe Doctrine principle seems undeniable. President Monroe looked to keep the old world (Europe) separate from the new world (Americas) because of their different political ideologies. Globalization has made this impossible today since LAC governments are free to trade with any foreign partner including the PRC resulting in less trade with the United States.

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was a contributing factor to today’s trade gap between the U.S. and PRC in Latin America. For over twenty years the U.S. was preoccupied with wars in the Middle East and took their favored trade status for granted. There are daily reminders of the split from American influence in the region as the Peruvian government now prints road signs around the Chancay Port in Spanish and Chinese, (Dube & Areddy, 2024).

Conclusion

The PRC is laying the groundwork for potential conflict through economic investments that also support military strategy. While the U.S. has dozens of actions available to counter PRC encroachment in the Western Hemisphere, I suggest the following responses to address the principles of the Monroe Doctrine:

• Provide alternatives to PRC Investment – Economically, the U.S. should strengthen ties to LAC governments through policies that provide more supportive financial lending practices than the PRC. When Western companies invest in LAC governments, they provide alternatives to Chinese investment. As US Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) Commander, General Richardson, stated in her March 2024 address to the House Armed Services Committee, “legislative efforts that responsibly incentivize U.S. and Western investment in the region could greatly add to a whole-of-society approach to national security,” (Richardson, 2024).
• Share Intelligence – The development of dual-use sites and monitoring facilities in the region shows the PRC’s commitment to encircling the U.S. politically, militarily, and economically, as well as in the cyber and space domains (Richardson, 2024). The U.S. must counter the PRC by exposing their predatory practices to allies in the region, which include suppression of any information contrary to their, “desired narratives,” (Richardson, 2024). Unfortunately, cumbersome U.S. intelligence practices restrict which partners receive classified information for risk of exposing sources to adversaries. U.S. investment into Western Hemisphere partners’ intelligence networks (human, technical, and procedural) will increase trust with LAC governments as they will be able to, “make informed decisions regarding engagement with the PRC,” (Richardson, 2024). 
• Bolster Alliances – Diplomatically strong ties to LAC governments are critical, but as General Richardson highlights, “some nations are without a U.S. ambassador because many have not been confirmed in a timely manner,” (Vergun, 2024). Having the right personnel to engage in diplomacy will help the U.S. show commitment in the region. As suggested by Maxwell, unilateral intervention by the U.S. is unlikely in the current post-Cold War era but strengthening regional alliances through diplomatic and military agreements are critical to deterrence in the region, (Maxwell, 2021). The United States should also reshape Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly known as the Rio Treaty, and the Organization of American States to protect territorial sovereignty in the region, (Maxwell, 2021).
• Defend American Interests in the Western Hemisphere – History has shown when the U.S. leaves countries outside the American, “defensive perimeter,” adversaries take advantage. This occurred in 1950 when Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, announced that the U.S. did not guarantee protection to the Republic of Korea. Six months after his proclamation, North Korea began its offensive south across the 38^th parallel. Therefore, the U.S. should communicate which countries, or areas like the Panama Canal, they will defend and prohibited areas for adversary military equipment or capabilities in the Western Hemisphere.

Learning from earlier times when the U.S. invoked the Monroe Doctrine, policy makers should clearly define which PRC actions cross a “red line.” It seems a dual-use port in Peru is outside the U.S. defensive sphere, but perhaps proximity to American shores is the issue. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 showed the U.S. was unwilling to entertain nuclear missiles less than 90 miles from the homeland. Perhaps if PLA equipment, weapons, and personnel were permanently based in Mexico the U.S. would opt for a response like President Kennedy employed against the Soviet Union. 

Matt Lensing is an active duty infantry officer who has served in the U.S. Army since 2007.

Works Cited

• Allen, K. W. (2022, October 4). The PLA’s Military Diplomacy in Advance of the 20th Party 
• Congress (Part Two). China Brief, pp. 14-25.
• Dube, R., & Areddy, J. T. (2024, June 13). A New Chinese Megaport in South America Is Rattling the U.S. Retrieved from The Wall Street Journal: https://www.wsj.com/world/chancay-peru-port-china-south-america-trade-ffc75d32
• Gray, J. (2023, January 22). Chinese Investment in Western Hemisphere Raising Concerns for U.S., Says SOUTHCOM Commadner. Retrieved from U.S. Naval Institute News: https://news.usni.org/2023/01/22/chinese-investment-in-western-hemisphere-raising-concerns-for-u-s-says-southcom-commander
• Maxwell, S. (2021). A New Hemispheric Defense Pact to Wage the Second Cold War Underway with China. Hemisferio Revista del Colegio Interamerican de Defensa(7), 110-135.
• Pires, M. C., & Gualberto do Nascimento, L. (2020). The Monroe Doctrine 2.0 and U.S.-China-Latin America Trilateral Relations. International Organisations Research Journal, 15(3). doi:10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-08
• Richardson, L. J. (2024). Statement of General Laura J. Richardson Commander, United States Southern Command Before the 118th Congress House Armed Services Committee. House Armed Services Committee (pp. 1-41). Washington, D.C.: United States Congress.
• Sensiba, J. (2022, October 7). Next-Generation Abrams Tanks & Strkers to Be Hybrids. Retrieved from Clean Technica: https://cleantechnica.com/2022/10/07/next-generation-abrams-tank-stryker-to-be-hybrids/
• Vergun, D. (2024, July 19). Russia, China Vying for Influence in Southern Hemisphere with US. Retrieved from Eurasia Review: https://www.eurasiareview.com/19072024-russia-china-vying-for-influence-in-southern-hemisphere-with-us/